# Universal Two-Factor Authentication for the Web And The Mac

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### "Treat your password like your toothbrush. Don't let anybody else use it, and get a new one every six months."

-Clifford Stoll

Who on earth does this?

## Most Used Passwords in 2014

- 1. 123456
- 2. password
- 3. 12345
- 4. 12345678
- 5. qwerty
- 6. 123456789
- 7. 1234

- 8. baseball
- 9. dragon
- 10. football
- 11.1234567
- 12. monkey
- 13. letmein

### 14.abc123

http://splashdata.com/press/worst-passwords-of-2014.htm

We are doomed!

## **Best Practices for Passwords**

- 1. Choose long passwords (e.g. use Dicewords<sup>™</sup>)
- 2. Do not use keyboard patterns (qwerty, etc.)
- 3. Do not use consecutive number sequences (1234)
- 4. Do not reuse passwords along different sites.
- 5. Change password regularly.

## Best Practices for Passwords

- 1. Choose long p ords
- Do not use keyboard patterns (qwerty, etc.)
  Almost impossible for every password.
  Do not use consecutive number sequences (1234) 4. Do not se an offine password manager!
  - Change r regur

se Dicewords™

## Authentication Is All About Factors

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**Knowledge Factors** 

Something only

the user knows

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### **Knowledge Factors**

Something only

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**Possession Factors** 

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### **Knowledge Factors**

Something only

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**Possession Factors** 



### **Inherence Factors**

Something only

the user is



## Two-Factor Authentication (2F)

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Time-based one time password TOTP (RFC 6238) **Counter-based one time password** HOTP (RFC 4226), iTAN or SMS

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### Drawbacks of Two-Factor Authentication

- Need to be able to receive SMS
- Needs to have your authenticator handy
- Transfer received code to login form
- As a fallback application specific passwords may be generated.
- Backup codes have to be stored at a secure location



### Drawbacks of Two-Factor Authentication

- Need to be able to receive SMS
- Needs to Your cannot login without the second factor.
- Transfer received code to login form
- As a fallback application specific passwords may be generated.
- Backup codes have to be stored at a secure location



## The FIDO Alliance

- Founded in summer 2012
- Publicly launched in February of 2013
- Published their first standard 1.0 in 2014-12-09



## Universal Second Factor Authentication U2F

## FIDO Universal-Two-Factor (U2F)

- Challenge-response public-private key cryptography
- Uses elliptic curve cryptography to minimize key-lengths
- Easy to use, just push a button

## How to use U2F?



### Register U2F device



### Authenticate w/ U2F device



































### Check appID c, a, origin











Check appID c, a, origin













### k<sub>pub</sub>, h, att. cert, signature (a, c, h, k<sub>pub</sub>)












### k<sub>pub</sub>, h, att. cert, signature (a, c, h, k<sub>pub</sub>)


U2F dongle



Browser


Webservice





### k<sub>pub</sub>, h, att. cert, signature (a, c, h, k<sub>pub</sub>)

U2F dongle



### Browser

Webservice

U2F device












U2F device












U2F device










### U2F device










### U2F device

### Check appID c, a, h, origin








### Lookup Kpriv from handle h counter++

Check appID c, a, h, origin








Lookup Kpriv from handle h counter++

Check appID c, a, h, origin

counter, signature (a, c, counter)








Lookup Kpriv from handle h counter++

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counter, signature (a, c, counter)

U2F dongle




Browser

Webservice

Lookup **k**priv from handle h counter++

Check appID c, a, h, origin

counter, signature (a, c, counter)



## How many accounts on the U2F dongle?

- As many as you like!
- is encrypted with a 256bit AES key on the secure element on the dongle.

• The private key is NOT stored on the device in Yubico's implementation. Instead it



## U2F Summary

- Every account on every website gets a new public-private key pair.
- The dongle has no UUID and cannot be tracked between different sites.
- No passcode has to be entered manually.
- No shared secret even if key handle and public keys leaked one cannot copy the U2F dongle.

## References

- Yubico U2F demo server <u>https://demo.yubico.com/u2f</u>
- The U2F specifications <u>https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/download/</u>
- Yubico developers for U2F <u>https://developers.yubico.com/U2F/</u>
- Yubico U2F C host library <u>https://github.com/Yubico/libu2f-host</u>